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Este trabajo propone un marco de trabajo para una política económica regional
en Colombia. Se estudian las características regionales y se muestra que las
disparidades regionales son significativas y persistentes a lo largo del tiempo. Por
ello, se hace necesario llevar a cabo una política económica que promueva el desarrollo
de las regiones más pobres del país. Este estudio aprovecha lecciones de otros casos
de política económica regional y propone un marco de trabajo basado en una
iniciativa de política regional que actualmente se está implementando en Brasil.
Palabras clave: Economía regional, política regional, disparidades, convergencia.
Clasificación JEL: R23, R38, R51, R53, R58.
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a framework for a regional economic policy in Colombia. The
regional characteristics and disparities of the country are studied, and regional dispari-
ties are shown to be both significant and persistent over time. This calls for a policy
initiative to promote the development of the poorer regions of the country. The study here
draws lessons from other cases of regional economic policy, and proposes a framework
based on the regional policy initiative that is currently being implemented in Brazil.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although finding answers to some specific questions regarding regional econo-
mies may be interesting per se, there are important reasons for studying the regional
economic situation in Colombia. Traditionally, regional economic disparities are
undesirable, especially when they are persistent over time. With an adequate knowl-
edge about the regional economies, it could be possible to design efficient policies to
reduce such disparities.
Colombia currently does not have a regional economic policy directed at reduc-
ing regional disparities. Even if moderate by Latin American standards, regional dis-
parities in the country are both significant and persistent, and this might call for the
development of such a policy.
The study presented in this paper is part of a project aimed at developing a set of
policy recommendations that could define the foundation for a future regional eco-
nomic policy in Colombia. The first phase of this project was to study the regional-
policy initiatives implemented in other countries, and evaluate their effectiveness.
The European Union, Spain, Italy and Brazil were identified as cases bearing particu-
lar importance for Colombia.
The European Union has a well-developed and relatively transparent regional
policy to support the poorer regions of its member states. These policy initiatives have
been extensively researched and documented. The enlargement of the Union, which is
taking place this year, has, furthermore, resulted in a thorough reform of current poli-
cies and has also induced an interesting debate and considerable research in this area.
Spain and Italy are both Latin countries with a long history of active regional policy.
Both countries have implemented a large set of initiatives with mixed results. Finally,
Brazil is the only Latin American country with a well-developed regional policy. It is
also a middle-income country and has, thereby, many similarities with Colombia. The
study of these four cases was documented in Pérez and Rowland (2004).
The second phase of the project concentrated on Colombia, and aims to draw some
lessons for the development of a regional-policy initiative for the country. This part of
the study is presented in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses regional
economic policy in general and what policy instruments are available. The section
also includes a literature review and a review of the cases of Spain, Italy and Brazil.
Section 3 continues with a study of the regional characteristics and disparities of
Colombia. In section 4, lessons for Colombia are drawn from the earlier analysis and
some policy recommendations are made. Section 5 finally concludes the paper.
II. REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
Regional policy exists because of the persistence of regional disparities in a range
of variables, which have a large impact on the economic welfare of a nation’s inhabit-
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ants. However, the existence of regional disparities in economic welfare is in itself not
a sufficient condition to justify the development of a regional policy in a country. In
fact, regional policy should be regarded as an important component of a broader
economic policy that covers national policy objectives. It should be mentioned that
regional disparities may cause severe problems, since they might indeed prevent the
achievement of national policy objectives, such as providing adequate job opportu-
nities or distributing income and wealth more equitably. In addition, such disparities
may have political and social consequences. Section 2.1 presents a set of instruments
available for the design of a regional policy. In section 2.2, the relevant literature of
the area is surveyed, and section 2.3 looks at the regional policy initiatives of Spain,
Italy and Brazil, which are three cases of particular importance for Colombia.
1. An Overview of Regional Policy Instruments
This section presents some regional policy instruments that are available for deci-
sion makers.1 Those instruments can be classified as macro-policy and micro-policy
instruments. From a regional point of view, policy instruments are designed either to
influence the allocation of productive resources or to change the level of income and
expenditure in specific regions. In that sense, macro-instruments are concerned with
changing aggregate regional income and expenditure, while micro-instruments of
regional policy are concerned with the design of incentives to allocate capital and
labour between regions and industries.
In practice, macro-policies are designed to have different impacts in different re-
gions. The effect of that impact depends on the objective the macro policy is pursuing.
That is, deliberately introducing a regional dimension into the macroeconomic man-
agement of the national economy so that changes in output and employment can be
induced in specific regions. For example, a depreciation of the exchange rate or an
expansion of the economy through fiscal or monetary policies will have different
effects on the output and employment of different regions. Regional economies, fur-
thermore, tend to respond differently to national shocks.
The major objective of micro-policies is to cause labour and capital to allocate in
areas (or regions), which they would normally not choose. There are various ways in
which micro-policy instruments can be used to induce a reallocation of labour and
capital, as illustrated by Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Policies to reallocate labour cover all kinds of instruments oriented at inducing la-
bour to move into those economic activities where its marginal product is highest.2 As
1 This section is based on Armstrong and Taylor (2000).
2 There are examples of policies aimed at reallocating labour into areas where marginal
productivity is not optimal. This is normally undertaken to satisfy political pressure
groups. Such misuse of regional policy instruments is a significant risk, which will be
discussed in chapter 4.
1. Juan David Barón.p65 26/02/05, 07:49 p.m. 51A REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY FOR COLOMBIA 52
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogotá (Colombia) 7 (2): 49-87, diciembre de 2004
can be seen in Figure 1, there are two major ways that can be used to reallocate labour.
First, there are the in situ mobility policies to reallocate labour. This kind of policies aims
at increasing the occupational and industrial movement of labour in existing regions.
Occupational training and retraining of workers, and education policies are two exam-
ples of in situ mobility policies of labour. Second, there are transfer policies. This type of
policies is directed toward inducing a shift in the supply of labour between regions.
Figure 1
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It is important to take into account that labour does not respond quickly to re-
gional differentials in wage rates or unemployment rates. In fact, labour mobility is far
from perfect (between regions or between occupations). Regional policy emphasis
has in many cases been placed on policies designed to move capital into lagged areas
instead of policies designed to increase the mobility of the labour between regions.
This is because reducing the impediments to migration is much more difficult than
directing capital flows to specific regions. Moreover, there is the fear that encouraging
migration could worsen the economic situation of lagged regions, because people
who migrate first tend to be  the most qualified.
There are three different groups of impediments to labour mobility between regions:
First, wage differentials between regions (occupations as well as industries) often do not
respond to corresponding differentials in the marginal labour productivity. Second,
even if such differentials do occur, labour may not fully perceive them. Third, even if
differentials occur and are perceived, there are costs associated with migration.
A reason for the failure of earnings differentials to reflect the differential marginal
productivity of labour is the existence of imperfect labour markets. When occupa-
tional wages are established nationally, earnings differentials between regions do not
respond to the efficiency of the marginal worker. That is, for example, the case in
Colombia with the minimum salary, which is the same in the whole country, even if
labour productivity varies significantly between the regions. Because markets are
given the wrong economic signals, labour migration will not occur.
Government policies can encourage plant-level bargaining rather than national-
level bargaining so that wages become responsive to local labour market conditions.
This could help to alleviate the gap between earnings differentials and marginal pro-
ductivity of labour differentials.
The second group of impediments to labour migration appears when the potential
migrants do not perceive the opportunities available for them in other regions. That is
because information, which is crucial for the appropriate functioning of the labour
markets, is incomplete. Potential migrants’ decisions are, therefore, based on incom-
plete information. Individuals who want to migrate need not only job information for
themselves but also information about the well-being of their families such as, for
example, schools, housing, and living costs in the new region, together with social life
and cultural differences. Lack of this kind of information may prevent a potential
migrant from moving.
In Britain, for example, this kind of impediments has usually been tackled by an
extensive network of government job centres. These centres make more fluent the flow
of information. Nevertheless, a good flow of formal information might not be enough.
The third group of impediments to migration is the costs associated with the physi-
cal movement from one region to another as well as the cost of changing occupations.
First, there are the pecuniary costs of moving or retraining. Another problem is the
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liquidity constraint of the individual; this usually plays a major role in preventing the
migration of workers. The liquidity constraint impedes the workers from moving to
another location or getting the necessary training even though it may well pay off in
the long run. Second, there are the non-pecuniary costs that have been shown to have
an even greater importance. People will not be willing to leave the region where they
have family, friends, and personal ties for another region where they do not.3 This
group of costs also includes those related to the amenities of the regions. Amenities are
special characteristics of a region such as the culture, the weather, and the landscape.
Governments have attacked the problems of financial impediments to labour mo-
bility in many ways. A government could encourage and finance training, retraining,
and migration schemes in the private sector. It could also intervene directly by offer-
ing retraining programmes or providing grants to trainees. In general, these policies
are designed to stimulate migration by reducing the cost of moving.
Costs that have proved more difficult to deal with are the non-pecuniary ones.
Programmes designated to subsidise only the pecuniary costs of migration are gener-
ally not effective unless combined with the right kind of attractions in destination
regions. A good example of how non-pecuniary costs can be alleviated is the British
new town policy, which in the past provided a package of job, home, and urban
facilities. However, some argue that this type of costs should not be subsidised.
Regional policies, aimed at encouraging the mobility of the labour force between
regions or occupations, try to match the demand and supply for labour by operating in
the supply side of the market. This kind of policies take as given the skill structure, the
geographical pattern, and the industrial distribution of labour demand. On the other
hand, the complementary policy is to improve the degree of matching between the
demand and supply for labour by redirecting the demand for labour to regions with
excess supply, which are often underdeveloped regions. Inward investment is a potential
policy in such regions, but there are also additional instruments of regional policy that
induce the growth of investment in indigenous economic activities within regions.
As Figure 2 shows, policies to reallocate capital toward disadvantaged regions
take five forms: First, there are fiscal incentives such as taxes and subsidies to encour-
age or discourage capital to flow towards specific regions. Second, there are the ad-
ministrative controls such as regulations on the location of firms, partial or complete
elimination of planning and custom regulations, or reductions of administrative and
bureaucratic requirements on firms. Third, there are policies to develop social capital.
These normally take the form of community development initiatives. Fourth, there are
policies to improve the efficiency of firms. These kind of policies aim at helping firms
to improve their production and management processes, through consultancy and
advisory services in poorer regions. Fifth, there are policies designated to improve the
3 In middle-income countries, such as Colombia, which lacks a social safety net, this con-
straint becomes very important. Low-skilled workers and their families generally depend
on family and friends to help them if they should become sick or unemployed.
1. Juan David Barón.p65 26/02/05, 07:49 p.m. 54JUAN DAVID BARÓN, GERSON JAVIER PÉREZ, PETER ROWLAND 55
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogotá (Colombia) 7 (2): 49-87, diciembre de 2004
efficiency of the capital market. The idea behind these types of policies is to provide
easy access to financial resources in lagging regions.
Of all these instruments, three have been of particular importance in regional
economic policy: labour and capital subsidies, administrative controls, and commu-
nity development initiatives. The most extensively used have, nevertheless, been
capital subsidies.
Capital subsidies can be established (in the case of a lagged region) on firm inputs,
firm outputs, or on technology research and dissemination. Moreover, subsidies to
inputs are of three classes: (i) on capital, land, or buildings, such as building grants,
capital grants or local tax and rent relief; (ii) on labour, such as wage subsidies and
expertise labourers migration grants; and (iii) on other inputs such as transport cost
subsidies or energy subsidies. The idea with all three is to improve the competitive-
ness of firms in underdeveloped areas where high unemployment is present. Another
type of subsidy on inputs is on technology such as for research and development of
new products, and for the dissemination of technological information. Alternatively,
output could be subsidised as well. This enables firms to sell products at lower prices.
2. Survey of Relevant Literature
As discussed in the previous section, a regional policy should have as its main
objective to support lagging regions. To design an efficient regional policy, it is,
nevertheless, important to establish the overall impact of the policy on the prosperous
regions as well, because it is impossible to assess the effect of a regional policy on the
national economy unless we know its impact on both underdeveloped areas and pros-
perous areas.4 There is a wide-ranging literature dealing with the regional policy
topic. Some of the papers approach the issue from a micro point of view, and others
from a macro-level. A large number of specific country studies exist. Different models
and methodologies have been used, but all of them with the common objective of
analysing and assessing the impact of regional policy, not only on provinces and
regions of a country, but also on countries forming economic unions.
In a recent and important paper, Shankar and Shah (2001) examine regional policy
performance across different countries. Their objective was to empirically test the
hypothesis that a decentralised fiscal constitution leads to increased regional in-
equalities in developing economies. Using multi-country data,5 they carried out some
exercises in order to measure inequality. Their results showed that regional develop-
ment policies have failed in many countries, both in federal and in unitary ones. Also,
federal countries were those suffering the most from regional inequalities. This, they
concluded, is because large inequalities have a larger political impact on a unitary
4 See Tyler (1980).
5 The authors used data on industrial and non-industrial countries, taken into two groups:
federal and unitary ones.
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government than on a federal government. At the regional policy level, the authors
concluded that countries experiencing divergence were those with strong interven-
tionist regional policies.
In the same way, several other studies have been analysing the effectiveness and
performance of policies aimed at reducing regional disparities. Such studies in-
clude, for example, Faini and Schialtarelli (1987), Moore and Rhodes (1976),
Berentsen (1978) and Tyler (1980), which all analysed country-specific regional
policies from a macro point of view, while studies like Ashcroft and Taylor (1977)
analysed regional policy implications through the movement of the manufacturing
industry. In the case of regional policy specific modelling, Treyz, Friedlaender and
Stevens (1980), developed a regional policy simulation model for the labour sector.
Since this set of studies is of particular interest for the discussion in the following
sections, they are presented in more detail.
Faini and Schiantarelli (1987) studied the performance of regional policy in Scot-
land. They had two main objectives, which were to show how regional issues could be
included into an investment model, and to explain aggregate manufacturing invest-
ment in the country for the period 1961 to 1979. They use a model of the firm6 and a
single equation (OLS and FIML) methodology. The results indicated that local effec-
tive factor prices are very important in the determination of regional allocation of
investments, and particularly that labour costs in developed areas have a very impor-
tant effect on investment in backward regions. They also found that both incentives to
stimulate capital and subsidies to reduce labour costs are highly significant in influ-
encing the investment allocation.
A number of studies have analysed the behaviour over time of regional develop-
ment in the United Kingdom. One of those papers is by Tyler (1980), who analysed the
West Midlands during the fifties, sixties, and first half of the seventies. The objective
of the study was to determine whether the worsening economic problems of the region
were the result of regional policy, of changes in the national economy, or of other factors.
The author specifically wanted to prove the hypothesis that “regional policy, by redis-
tributing demand from prosperous regions to development areas, enables the economy
to be run at a higher level of demand but with the same pressure of demand in the
prosperous regions”.7 The results indicated that the regional policy was not the cause
for manufacturing jobs to be lost in the region. Instead, the main cause was the rapid
growth of national manufacturing employment in combination with the less favour-
able industrial structure from the late sixties onwards of the West Midlands.
6 Assumptions of the model are: a putty-clay technology and a linear homogeneous ex-ante
production function; the firm is a monopolistic competitor producing homogeneous goods
that are substitutes for one another in two different plants located in different regions;
two duopolistic competitors, each one located in a different region; regional independ-
ence in investment decisions; and rational expectations about optimal output consistent
with steady state.
7 Tyler (1980), p. 152.
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Ashcroft and Taylor (1977) analysed the U.K. manufacturing industry as an object of
great interest in evaluating regional policy. They were looking for the causes of the
movement of manufacturing industry to development areas between 1961 and 1971. The
variable to be explained was, as in Tyler (1980), the moves into the development areas.
This was explained by regional policy variables, such as labour and capital subsidies and
location controls, and other variables, including male unemployment rate,8 spare capac-
ity index, index of industrial production, and the index of investment expenditures. The
results obtained indicated that regional policy was not the only factor affecting the move-
ment of industry to the development areas, and neither was it the most important one.
The regional earnings structure is another area that has attracted significant atten-
tion in the empirical literature. One such study on the United Kingdom is Hart and
Mackay (1977), who proposed and tested the earnings spread hypothesis.9 The paper
studied the transmission mechanism through which earnings increases from the so-
called leading market are transferred to the lagging market. Simultaneous equation
estimates showed that in the pre-war period there was a two-way spread between
London and the other markets, while in the post-war period emerging regional wage
leaders appeared to transmit earnings increases back to London as well as to other
local markets. In this sense, earnings increases can be transferred from one region to
others even if labour mobility is limited.
Austria has been another country attracting significant interest, because of its long
history of regional policy. Austria’s regional policy consisted of several strategies in
order to reduce inequalities in regional incomes and living standards, and to reduce
out-migration from rural areas. Berentsen (1978) did an evaluation of the Austrian
regional development policies in order to establish if regional policies had had any
effects in reducing regional inequalities between 1957 and 1971, and if it had reduced
out-migration from rural areas during that period. The national government had de-
fined six problem regions in need of assistance, including the dead borders,10 as well
as some other rural and poor industrialised regions. Results of the study indicated that
regional policies had an important positive impact in lessening regional inequalities
and the out-migration from rural areas.
The European Union is another prominent case in the area of regional policy.11 In
addition to the regional-policy initiatives of its individual member states, the Union
8 This variable was used as a measure of the demand pressure.
9 They defined this hypothesis in the following way: “earnings changes in the leading
market are a function of the excess demand for labour in that market, and earnings
changes in the leading market are passed on, in the whole or in part, to the lagging
markets”. Hart and Mackay (1977), p. 267.
10 This type of regions has been characterized by agricultural areas, near to the Czech,
Hungarian and Yugoslav frontiers.
11 The European Union currently consists of 15 member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. On 1 May 2004, the Union is being expanded
by another ten countries: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
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has a well-developed and sophisticated regional policy to support the development
and structural adjustment of the lagging regions of its member states. An extensive
literature exists on the European Union, its regional disparities, its regional policies,
and the regional consequences of its enlargement.12
Funck and Pizzati (2003) edited a wide range of papers covering the most recently
discussed topics of regional growth and regional policy in the European Union. Sub-
jects such as convergence, economic geography, the enlargement and economic de-
velopment are discussed and analysed, and a number of country cases are included.
The conclusions of the book are mixed, but there is something close to a consensus
among the book’s authors that regional policy functions as a substitute for labour
mobility, but that it does so at a cost to efficiency. It may reduce regional disparities
but at a cost to national growth, since it leads firms to make investments where they
would not otherwise have made them. The book is, consequently, critical about the
effectiveness of regional policy. Subsidies are, nevertheless, best used to improve
education and infrastructure, such as transport, communications, power and water,
rather than being spent on business location incentives.
There have also been several works on convergence in the European Union.13
Boldrin and Canova (2001) analysed European regional policies and regional conver-
gence. They used data, specifically per-capita income, for 185 European regions of
the 15 member states for the period 1980 to 1996. Their results indicated that neither
absolute convergence nor divergence was taking place during the period. They, nev-
ertheless, conclude that regional policy has acted as an important redistributive in-
strument, which is motivated by the nature of political equilibrium upon which the
European Union is built.
Finally, Treyz, Friedlaender and Stevens (1980) made an important contribution
by building a model that has proven useful for forecasting and policy evaluation. This
model includes features such as factor substitution, location effects14 and the quanti-
fication of the relative magnitudes of the factor-substitution effect and location effect.
In the general equilibrium analysis they established simultaneous models of the re-
gional economy using the Massachusetts Economic Policy Analysis (MEPA) frame-
work.15 In this sense they showed that it is possible to develop and to implement a
model which meets the requirements of general equilibrium, and also incorporates
regional economic and location theories.
12 For example, Armstrong and Taylor (2000), and Bachtler and Yuill (2001). See also Pérez
and Rowland (2004).
13 See, for instance, Boldrin and Canova (2001), Baumont, Ertur and le Gallo (2001), and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991).
14 They defined location effects as the change in any input price in a region relative to that
in other output regions will tend to change production costs in the region in question.
15 See Treyz, Friedlaender and Stevens (1980) for a definition and discussion.
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3. The Cases of Spain, Italy, and Brazil
Spain, Italy and Brazil are three cases that bear particular importance for Colom-
bia. They are all Latin countries with a long history of regional policy. In addition,
Brazil in the only Latin American country with a well-developed regional policy.
These cases have all been studied and documented in Pérez and Rowland (2004). We
are, therefore, in this section only summarising and evaluating the main features of
these policy initiatives.
In Spain, a regional policy was initially developed in the 1960s. A more ambitious
regional policy was, however, not implemented until the 1980s, with the creation of
the Comunidades Autónomas,16 which were autonomous regional governments. A
significant part of the political decision power was decentralised from Madrid to the
new regional governments, and these took an active part in the formation of the new
regional policy. The main instrument of this policy was the Fondo Compensación
Interterritorial,17 with the core objective of reducing regional disparities.18 As a mem-
ber of the European Union,19 Spain has been able to enjoy additional regional ben-
efits. As discussed in the previous section, the Union has a well developed regional
policy, and the transfers from the European Union to the Spanish regions have in many
cases been larger than those from the Spanish Government.20
If a regional policy is successful it should generate a clear and sustained conver-
gence among the poorer and the richer regions of a country. A number of studies have
been made to evaluate the impact of the Spanish regional policy.21 The over-all results
are inconclusive, and no clear convergence has been shown to take place. In that
sense, the regional policy initiatives have not differentially affected the poorer re-
gions in a significant way.
Italy is another country with a long history of regional policy.22 What is special for
Italy is its clear north-south divide, where the North has been very prosperous, while
the South, the so called Mezzogiorno, has been lagging behind. In the 1950s, when
regional policy was first introduced in the country, the South suffered from a critical
economic and social situation, low educational levels, low industrial development,
high agricultural dependence, and an income per capita of about half that of the
northern region. In line with many other European countries, a fund was created to
help the south to develop, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (the Mezzogiorno Fund). It
16 Autonomous Regions.
17 Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund.
18 As a governmental fund, this was created to carry out public investment plans, and takes
the form of a regional redistributive grant. See García-Milà and McGuire (1993).
19 Spain joined the European Union, then called the European Community, in 1986.
20 See Garcia-Milà and McGuire (2001) for an extensive descriptive study of the Spanish
regional policy and its impact.
21 See, for example, García-Milà and McGuire (2001), and Lamo (2000).
22 For studies on Italian regional policy, see, for example, Acconcia and del Monte (1999),
Paci and Pagliaru (1998), and Paci and Saba (1997).
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was mainly used for infrastructure and agricultural expenditures, but it also contrib-
uted to industrial development projects. Another initiative was the creation of state
owned industrial firms, which had to locate 40 percent of their investment and 60
percent of their new plants in the Mezzogiorno, with the objective of being a catalyst
for growth. In the early 1990s, Italian regional policies were restructured as the Maastrich
Treaty of the European Union was implemented. Many public companies were priva-
tised, and in 1992, the Mezzogiorno Fund was abolished, and a new framework for
regional policy was developed. This implied that not only the Mezzogiorno region
was to receive regional development grants, but that all poor areas of the country
should be targeted. In the Mezzogiorno, the consequence was a significant reduction
in public spending, which resulted in a lower economic growth rate.
If the impact of regional policy is evaluated, the results generally indicate that a
limited convergence process took place between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s.
However, thereafter, regional inequality has been increasing, especially between the
Mezzogiorno and Italy’s North. This was particularly the case during the second half
of the 1970s, as the Mezzogiorno was severely affected by the recession generated by
the first oil shock. From the 1950s and up until now, the Mezzogiorno regions have
continued to lag far behind the North. Development has, nevertheless, not been ho-
mogenous. While Abruzzo has been the success story in the Mezzogiorno, regions
like Sicily seem to be doomed laggards.23
Brazil is another interesting case in regional-policy analysis. In line with many
other countries, the Brazilian government has used a number of regional policy instru-
ments aimed at promoting growth in the poorer regions of the country. Such policy
initiatives include infrastructure investments, incentives for private investments, in-
vestment initiatives of the state enterprises, and granting of tax exemptions. In the late
1930s, Brazil implemented a development policy based on import substitution. One
of the results of this policy was that the South and the Southeast of the country, and
then particularly Sao Paulo, increased its share of the industrial provision at the ex-
pense particularly of the North and Northeast, which came to lag far behind. A regional
policy was implemented in the 1970s to counterbalance this development. Some
special agencies were created to promote the economic growth of the lagging regions:
SUDAM in the North, SUDENE in the Northeast, and SUFRAMA in Manaus.
The results of Brazil’s regional policy efforts have been, at best, mixed.24 The
Northeast has not showed a clear improvement. The North and the Mid-West have
shown some important improvements in the product growth, but this might be due to
the fact that these are frontier states rather than due to a successful regional policy.25
23 See Helg, Peri and Viesti (2000) for an interesting analysis of this subject.
24 See, for example, Gomes (2002), and Markusen (1996).
25 Frontier states are those with large unexplored land areas. High economic growth rates
in such states are often due to exploration of new land areas rather than to a successful
regional policy initiative.
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Brazil has recently restructured its regional policy, and a number of policy initia-
tives are currently being implemented in order to reduce regional inequalities. The most
important of these is the Programa dos Eixos Nacionais de Desenvolvimento, which is a
long-term regional development programme that divides the country into nine develop-
ment areas, eixos.26 The objective of this new classification is to divide the country into
areas with similar geographical and social-economic conditions in order to exploit
economies of scale and comparative advantages. In this way, regional growth will be
promoted through developing current strengths and present advantages.
III. REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN COLOMBIA
Due to its mountainous geography, Colombia is more culturally and geographi-
cally diverse than many Latin American countries. Large parts of the country are very
isolated, and infrastructure construction is in many cases posting a great challenge. In
this section, we will study the economic disparities between the different regions of
the country. Section 3.1 introduces the geographical characteristics of the country and
discusses the regional impact of the historical development of the country as well as of
the violence it has suffered in some particular periods. Section 3.2 discusses the eco-
nomic differences between the different regions, and in section 3.3, Colombia’s re-
gional disparities are placed in an international context.
1. An Introduction to Colombia and its Regions
As it can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 1, Colombia is divided in 32 departments
and a capital district, Bogotá.27 Bogotá is also the nation’s capital city and has 6.5
million inhabitants, which is 15.2 percent of the total population of the country.28 The
second and third most important cities are Medellín (Antioquia) and Cali (Valle del
Cauca)29 with some 2.0 and 2.2 million inhabitants, respectively.30 It should be noted
that Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali are all inland cities.
26 Eixos Nacionais de Integração e Desemvolvimento are formally defined as territorial
spaces delimited to planning targets according to socio-economic and environmental
dynamics.
27 In the rest of this paper we will include Bogotá in Cundinamarca, even if it is administra-
tively a separate entity (a capital district).
28 Population information is for 2001.
29 Valle del Cauca is often also referred to only as Valle.
30 Medellin is, in reality, significantly larger than Cali. The Medellin metropolitan area has some
2.9 million inhabitants, while the Cali metropolitan area has some 2.4 million inhabitants.
The respective department is named in parentheses after the city.
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Figure 3
The Colombian departments
Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC).
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Table 1
Basic characteristics of the Colombian departments
Department  Population 
(inhabitants) 
Area 












Antioquia 5,454,871  63,612  Medellín  1,486  20 
Atlántico 2,174,929  3,388  Barranquilla 30  28 
Bolívar 2,043,508  25,978 
Cartagena de 
Indias 2  28 
Boyacá 1,375,222  23,189  Tunja  2,782  13 
Caldas 1,120,691  7,888  Manizales  2,216  16 
Caquetá 427,823  88,965  Florencia  450  26 
Cauca 1,277,129  29,308  Popayán  1,738  19 
Cesar 979,443  22,905  Valledupar  169  28 
Córdoba 1,337,610  25,020  Montería  18  28 
Cundinamarca 2,184,664  22,623  Bogotá  2,600  14 
Chocó 408,560  46,530  Quibdó 43  28 
Huila 939,136  19,890  Neiva 442  27 
La Guajira  491,511  20,848  Riohacha  3  28 
Magdalena 1,308,493  23,188  Santa  Marta  6  27 
Meta 714,659  85,635  Villavicencio  467  25 
Nariño 1,661,323  33,268  Pasto  2,527  14 
Norte Santander  1,375,374  21,658  Cúcuta  320  27 
Quindío 572,565  1,845  Armenia  1,483  20 
Risaralda 960,585  4,140  Pereira 1,415  21 
Bogotá D.C.  6,573,291  1,587  Bogotá  2,600  14 
Santander 1,989,666  30,537  Bucaramanga  959  24 
Sucre 809,647  10,917  Sincelejo  213  26 
Tolima 1,300,944  23,562  Ibagué 1,285  22 
Valle del Cauca  4,246,896  22,140  Cali  995  23 
          
Nuevos 
Departamentos 1,306,852  483,127      
          
Amazonas 72,445  109,665  Leticia  96  29 
Arauca 248,440  23,818  Arauca 125  28 
Casanare 293,391  44,640  Yopal  350  26 
Guanía 38,370  72,238  Puerto  Inirida  100  29 
Guaviare 120,361  42,327 
San José del 
Guaviare  240 28 
Putumayo 341,513  24,885  Mocoa  595  25 
San Andrés y 
Providencia  75,445 44  San  Andrés  4  29 
Vaupés 30,591  65,268  Mitú  180  27 
Vichada 86,296  100,242  Puerto  Carreño  90  28 
          
Colombia 43,035,392  1,141,748  Bogotá  2,600  14 
Note: Population figures as of 2001.
Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC), and DANE.
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Barranquilla (Atlántico), Cartagena de Indias31 (Bolívar), and Santa Marta
(Magdalena) are the largest coastal cities in Colombia with a total population be-
tween them of 2.6 million inhabitants. All these cities are located on the Caribbean
Coast and they are more developed than the coastal cities of the Pacific Coast, of
which Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca) is the largest. It should be mentioned that the
most developed part of Colombia is its inland area, especially departments such as
Cundinamarca (Bogotá included), Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, and Santander.
On the contrary, peripheral departments such as Sucre, Cesar, and Magdalena, on the
Caribbean Coast, Chocó, Cauca, and Nariño, on the Pacific Coast, and almost all
the Nuevos Departamentos32 are the underdeveloped areas in Colombia. Except for
some of the Nuevos Departmentos, these departments base their economies on agri-
culture and cattle farming.
The climatic and geographical characteristics of Colombia are other important
factors in explaining the regional disparities of the country. Although located in the
tropical zone of the world, Colombia has diversified climates because of the three
mountain ranges that cross the country from south to north. As can be seen in Table 1,
the altitude of the capital cities of the different departments varies from 2 up to 2,800
meters above sea level, while average annual temperatures vary from as low as 13 up
to 28 degrees Celsius. The three largest cities are, furthermore, located at considerable
altitudes, which gives them a much colder climate than the hot tropical climate typi-
cal of the coasts.
It is, furthermore, difficult to analyse the regional disparities in Colombia without
a good knowledge of the country’s historical background. Colombia’s historical de-
velopment can, in fact, explain to a large extent many of the regional differences that
exist in the country today.
The history of Colombia can be divided into four distinct periods: Pre-colonial
era, conquest, colonial era, and modern era. Before and during the conquest, the popu-
lation was generally clustered in the highlands in order to avoid high temperatures
and all associated diseases. During the colonial era, the Caribbean coast came to be
the most important place for international trade. In the history of Colombia, the
Magdalena River deserves a special mention as one of the most important transporta-
tion links. The three mountain ranges that cross the country made land communica-
tion very complicated and expensive.
Another important factor when analysing the regional development of Colombia
is the violence that has plagued the country. It would be difficult to correctly establish
what type of regional policy to implement without a thorough study of violence and
its relationship with other social political and economic aspects. Poverty, drug traf-
31 Cartagena de Indias is normally referred to only as Cartagena.
32 Nuevos Departamentos (New Departments) include Amazonas, Arauca, Casanare, Guainía,
Guaviare, Putumayo, San Andrés y Providencia, Vaupés, and Vichada.
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ficking, guerrillas and displaced people all have strong relationships with violence.
The violence has, furthermore, been concentrated to certain regions of the country.
Querubín (2003) established, to a departmental level, the relationship between vio-
lence and the economic growth. He found how violence negatively affect departmen-
tal growth product. Specifically, those departments which had more acelerated violence
indicators were those experiencing less economic growth.
The most violent parts of the country have historically been in rural areas, where
property rights are weak and where the concentration of lucrative commercial goods is
high.33 This situation dates back to the first half of the nineteenth century and the
colonisation of the country, when violence generated migration flows of displaced
people looking for less dangerous regions. Up until this date, people in violent rural
areas have tended to migrate either to the cities or to less violent frontier regions.
However, the frontier regions have tended to quickly turn violent, since its inhabitants
to a larger extent are exposed to illegal activities.
There are clear relationships between violence, displaced people, guerrillas and
drug trafficking. It is, however, less clear when and how these relationships were
created. For example, Legrand (1994) indicated that in Guaviare the guerrillas came
before drug trafficking, but in Caguán, the story was the opposite. This process has
been converging until a point where the guerrilla movement is deeply involved in
drug trafficking, and this is, indeed, its main source of financing today.
To study the regional characteristics of Colombia and to develop a regional policy,
a good understanding of the institutions and groups involved and their individual and
joint interactions with regional development is essential. Such institutions and groups
include the national and regional governments, the guerrilla movements, drug traf-
fickers, displaced people, as well as other institutions and sectors of the economy.
2. Regional Characteristics of the Colombian Economy
According to DANE,34 the Colombian GDP was some COP 187.9 trillion in 2001,
corresponding to USD 81.7 billion.35 Of this amount, 53.2 percent was produced by
three departments: Antioquia (14.6 percent), Cundinamarca including Bogotá (27.1
percent), and Valle del Cauca (11.4 percent). On the contrary, the ten departments that
contributed less to the domestic product participated only with 12.5 percent of the
total production. This suggests that there are considerable differences in economic
activity and because of that, there are differences in regional inhabitants’ welfare.
33 See Legrand (1994).
34 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, the Colombian national statistics
department.
35 This paper uses Anglo-Saxon terminology, where one billion equals 1,000,000,000 and one
trillion equals 1,000,000,000,000.
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Anyone who studies per-capita regional GDP would find some considerable re-
gional disparities, which are important to mention. The presence of such disparities is
clearly illustrated by the map in Figure 4. In addition, Figure 5 shows regional per
capita GDP for the three richest and the three poorest departments in Colombia over
the period 1980 to 2001. Regarding this figure it is important to emphasise three
things. First, the wealthiest group (Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, and Cundinamarca
including Bogotá) grew significantly faster than the poorest group (Chocó, Nariño,
and Sucre). In fact, it is apparent from the figure that GDP per capita of each depart-
ment of the poorest group remained relatively stable over the whole period, while the
GDP per capita of the wealthiest departments has been growing almost every year
since 1980. Second, the gap between the per-capita GDP of the wealthiest and that of
the poorest increased from COP 2.61 million in 1980 to COP 3.43 million in 2001, in
constant terms. This is a consequence of the growth of the wealthiest and the stagna-
tion of the poorest. In relative terms, while in 1980 the GDP per capita of the poorest
was on average 40 percent of the GDP per capita of the wealthiest, in 2001 this figure
had fallen to 35 percent. The disparities have, consequently, worsened considerably
over the last 21 years. Third, it should be mentioned that all the departments exhibited
a contraction of their GDP per capita in 1999. This reduction was particularly impor-
tant in Cundinamarca (Bogotá included), which in 1999 experienced a contraction of
11.9 percent. The contraction in other rich departments was lower but certainly not
insignificant; Antioquia contracted by some 3.9 percent in 1999 and Valle del Cauca
by 5.2 percent. In the poorest regions, the contraction was 5.5, 5.6, and 2.8 percent in
Chocó, Sucre, and Nariño, respectively.
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Figure 4
Regional GDP per capita, 2001
Note: In 2001, the average USD/COP exchange rate was 2,299.
Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC), and DANE.
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Figure 5
Regional per-capita GDP for the three wealthiest and the three poorest
regions of Colombia (constant 2001 pesos)
* Cundinamarca includes Bogotá.
Note: In 2001, the average USD/COP exchange rate was 2,299.
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Table 2
Comparative measures and economic growth
for the Colombian departments
* Rates were obtained by ordinary least squares regressions of GDP per capita against an independ-
ent variable, which is a linear trend. The functional form is yt = y0 (1 + r)2, which is linear in logs.
** Cundinamarca includes Bogotá.
Source: DANE, and own estimations.
Table 2 complements the information in Figure 5. This table presents GDP per capita
for the years 1980 and 2001 as index numbers, where the national GDP per capita is
equal to 100. It should be noticed that in 1980 only seven departments had GDP-
per-capita levels above the national average. The other 14 departments exhibited
lower GDP per capita than the national average. Especially worrying are the cases of
the poorest regions mentioned earlier: Chocó, Sucre, and Nariño. These depart-
ments have also lost ground in relative terms as can be seen when comparing the
2001 and 1980 figures.
Some other departments, such as La Guajira and some of the Nuevos Departamentos,
have improved their conditions because of oil and mineral findings in their territories.
Department  GDP/capita 
2001 (pesos) 
GDP/capita 1980 
(Colombia = 100) 
GDP/capita 2001 







Antioquia 2,057,399  122  117  1.28 
Atlántico 1,540,130  132  88  -0.51 
Bolívar 1,398,715  91  80  0.85 
Boyacá 1,382,306  100  79  0.13 
Caldas 1,473,030  75  84  1.91 
Caquetá 1,107,173  92  63  0.26 
Cauca 975,536 51  56  1.67 
Cesar 1,340,772  90  77  0.64 
Córdoba 1,274,721  61  73  2.37 
Cundinamarca
** 2,318,054  138  132  1.50 
Chocó 760,287 45  43  0.93 
Huila 1,456,860  88  83  1.09 
La Guajira  1,956,695  48  112  3.93 
Magdalena 936,466  53  53  2.05 
Meta 2,058,516  126  118  1.61 
Nariño 777,263 49  44  0.78 
Norte 
Santander 1,061,504  72  61  0.27 
Quindío 1,308,568  119  75  0.02 
Risaralda 1,371,044  81  78  1.25 
Santander 2,345,318  105  134  2.04 
Sucre 788,001  57  45  0.28 
Tolima 1,627,078  83  93  2.22 
Valle 2,056,709  114  117  2.00 
Nuevos 
Departamentos 2,342,774  85  134  4.50 
        
Colombia 1,751,903  100  100  1.60 
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In 1980, the GDP per capita of La Guajira was 48 percent of the national average, while
21 years later it was 112 percent. In the case of the Nuevos Departamentos, the GDP per
capita increased from 85 percent to 134 percent, of the Colombian average. It should
be noticed that La Guajira and Nuevos Departamentos have low population density,
so an oil or mineral finding can have a very large impact on GDP per capita.
A further point that should be emphasized is that oil and mineral production tends
to distort GDP per capita as a regional welfare measure. A region or department that
obtains the main part of its GDP from oil and mineral production does not benefit from
this in the same way as a department that obtains its GDP from industrial or agricul-
tural production. In the former case, oil and mineral are the property of the national
government which also captures a significant part of the benefit, while in the case of
industrial and agricultural production, these tend to have a much larger impact on the
welfare of the regional inhabitants.
Table 2 also shows the annual growth rate of the regional GDP per capita. As can be
seen in the table, the three wealthiest departments grew faster on average than the
three poorest between 1980 and 2001. This suggests that the disparities have not been
reduced during the last 21 years. Indeed, the disparities seem to be increasing. From
the data in the table it is also apparent that Atlántico, one of the wealthiest depart-
ments in GDP-per-capita terms in 1980, had a negative rate of growth for the whole
period. This left the department below the national average at the end of the period.
The growth rate of Colombian GDP per capita was estimated at 1.60 percent for the
whole period. Departments that exceed the national growth rate were Meta (2.05
percent), Santander (2.04 percent), Tolima (2.22 percent), Valle del Cauca (2.00 per-
cent), and Nuevos Departamentos (4.50 percent).
So far, we have mentioned that the disparities in Colombia seem to have increased
between 1980 and 2001. In order to test this hypothesis, two measures of disparities
are calculated and presented.
The first measure of disparity is the Maximum-Minimum Ratio. To calculate
this, two departments were chosen: Cundinamarca (Bogotá included), which had
the highest GDP per capita in 1980, and Chocó, which had the lowest per-capita
GDP in the same year. The result of this calculation is presented in Figure 6. A high
value of this measure suggests that the disparities are increasing while a low value
suggests a decrease. If one looks at the value of the ratio in 1980 and the corre-
sponding value for 2001, it can be argued that the general trend of this measure is
constant. Nevertheless, the ratio fell during almost all of the decade of the 1980s,
and then it rapidly increased in the first part of the decade of the 1990s. After 1995,
the maximum-minimum ratio decreased, and in 2001 it stood at about the same
level as in 1980.
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Figure 6
Maximum-Minimum ratio
Source: DANE, and estimations by the authors.
The second measure that shows the evolution of regional disparities is the coef-
ficient of variation. This measure is, together with the logarithm of the GDP per
capita, the most commonly used measure of sigma convergence. There is sigma
convergence when these measures decrease over time. The coefficient of variation is
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Figure 7
Measures of sigma convergence
Source: DANE, and estimations by the authors.
As can be seen in Figure 7, both measures showed an upward trend from 1985 to
1999, when they started to fall. The behaviour of the indicators shown in the figure,
suggests that no sigma convergence has been present. In other words, disparities have
not decreased in the last 21 years. They rather seem to have increased.
Nevertheless, at the end of the period a reduction of disparities occurred. Comparing
the first value, for 1980, with the last value, for 2001, of the coefficient of variation, we
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Figure 8
Measures of beta convergence, 1980 – 2001
Note: Cundinamarca includes Bogotá.
Source: DANE, and estimations by the authors.
An additional measure of regional disparities is the concept of beta convergence.
According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, 1995) there is beta convergence if
there is a negative correlation between the annual growth rate of the GDP per capita
and its initial level. In this sense, if there was beta convergence, regions with a lower
initial level of per-capita income would be growing at higher rates than those regions
with higher initial levels. This makes the disparities fall. Otherwise, disparities would
not decrease, and they could even increase. Figure 8 shows the relationship between
these two variables for the Colombian departments.
Figure 8 shows a negative correlation between the initial level of income, year 1980,
and the annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 1980 and 2001. The simple coef-
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where the left side of the equation is the annual growth rate between 1980 and 2001,
which is regressed on the initial income per capita. If beta is significant, there is beta
convergence. In our case, beta is equal to 1.76 percent but it is not significant. This
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tive relationship between these two variables. Moreover, if La Guajira and Nuevos
Departamentos were excluded from the sample, the correlation would be reduced to -0.29.
Synthesizing the results obtained so far, we can say that Colombia has persistent
regional economic disparities.37 These disparities did not decrease over the last two
decades. Moreover, there is evidence indicating that the disparities are, in fact, in-
creasing. GDP per capita of the three poorest regions is currently on average only 35
percent of that of the richest ones. Evidence also suggests that there is neither beta nor
sigma convergence.
These results are according with a large number of studies about disparities in
Colombia. For example, Barón and Meisel (2003), analyzed the relationship between
decentralization and disparities and found that during the decentralization period
(1990 decade), there were a rise in regional disparities instead. Additionally, fiscal
transfers did not contribute to reduce inequality. They proposed a deep change in the
decentralization system in order to reduce regional disparities.
Other two works were those of Bonet and Meisel (1999) and Barón (2003). They
analyze the regional convergence in Colombia for the period 1926-1995 and 1980-
2000, respectively. Both studies, across a large number of measures, found that re-
gional disparities have not gone down in the last decade, in many cases they have
risen instead. There have been many causes to regional disparities in the country, for
example, the effects of policies to promote import substitution, and the secular eco-
nomic fall in the Caribbean Coast departments.38 Still, the lack of specific regional
policies has been the main cause of increasing inequality.
An interesting question is, however, how large these disparities are in an interna-
tional context.
3. Colombia in an International Perspective
Shankar and Shah (2001) calculated regional economic disparity measures for sev-
eral countries. Their results are presented in Figure 9.39 The figure shows three measures
of regional disparity in 23 countries for the year 1997. Some of these are industrial
countries, but the majority are developing countries. The countries are sorted by the
weighted coefficient of variation in descending order. Countries with the highest dis-
parities were Vietnam, Thailand, China, and Indonesia. As Shankar and Shah pointed
out, these countries are all unitary states, and they are all developing countries.
means that there is no beta convergence in the period 1980 to 2001, or in other words,
that regions with lower initial levels of GDP per capita in 1980 did not growth faster than
those regions with higher GDP per capita. This evidence does not support the hypothesis
of a reduction in the disparities between regions during the time period studied.
37 These results are similar to those fuond by Bonet and Meisel (1999) and Baron (2003).
38 Bonet and Meisel (1999), pp. 72.
39 We have added the figures for Colombia since it was not a part of their original sample.
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Except for Pakistan, Romania, and Colombia, all developing countries exhibited
higher disparities than the most unequal of the developed countries, France. Colom-
bia, on the other hand, showed a lower disparity than France, Italy and Germany, and
had, indeed, the lowest regional disparity of all the Latin American countries in the
sample. Finally, it should be noted that although Colombian disparities seem modest
from an international perspective, they have been increasing over the last two de-
cades. Also important to note is that many countries with smaller disparities than
Colombia have developed policy mechanisms to reduce such disparities.
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Figure 9
Comparisons of regional disparity measures in different countries
* Developed countries.
Source: DANE, and estimations by the authors.
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IV. REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR COLOMBIA
As we discussed in the previous section, regional disparities in Colombia are both
significant and persistent, which might call for the implementation of a regional policy
initiative, to promote the economic development of the lagging regions. We start by
drawing some lessons from the other cases of regional policy initiatives that have
been discussed in the previous sections as well as in Pérez and Rowland (2004), which
is done in section 4.1. In section 4.2, a first attempt to develop a framework for a
Colombian regional policy is made. Colombia has a relatively sophisticated distribu-
tion policy in place, and section 4.3 discusses the potential regional impact of this
policy initiative and how it should be aligned with a regional policy. In section 4.4,
the potential impact of corruption on a regional policy initiative is discussed.
1. Lessons from Other Cases of Regional Policy Initiatives
If a regional policy is successful, it should generate a clear and sustained conver-
gence among the poorer and the richer regions of a country. This was not the case in
any of the four economies studied in Pérez and Rowland (2004), i.e. the European
Union, Spain, Italy and Brazil. To develop a successful regional policy is, conse-
quently, neither easy nor straightforward.
A number of lessons can, nevertheless, be drawn from studying earlier and present
cases of regional policy initiatives. One such conclusion is that strong interventionist
regional policies often produces regional divergence, while policies that generate
convergence normally are carefully adopted initiatives, taking into account their im-
pact both at a national and at a regional level. Another major conclusion is that
regional policy grants are better spent on improving education and infrastructure
rather than being spent on industrial location incentives.
In Colombia, studies have shown that educational achievements vary consider-
ably between the different departments.40 In particular, it has been shown that inhab-
itants of the richer departments are significantly better educated than the inhabitants
of poor departments, which impairs growth in the latter. This is both because children
in the richer departments tend to go to school longer, and because the quality of
education in these departments is higher. International studies have, indeed, shown
that educational quality, and not just quantity, is an important factor in explaining
differences in economic growth rates between different countries.41 National
standardisation of educational attainments has also been shown to be an important
source of regional convergence.42
40 See, for example, Báez and Duncan (1999).
41 See, for instance, Behrman and Birdsall (1983), Neri (2001), and Sianesi and van Reenen
(2002).
42 See, for example, de la Fuente (2001).
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Investments in infrastructure, such as transport, communications, electricity and
water, is another area which has proven successful in generating regional conver-
gence. Unreliable telecommunications in many of Colombia’s poorer departments is,
for example, an impediment for businesses wanting to locate in such regions. Infra-
structure investments might, nevertheless, have an unwanted effect, at least in the
short run. Brazil, for example, implemented a number of highway infrastructure in-
vestment initiatives in order to support regional integration. These initiatives have
been criticised because, despite their usefulness for national integration, the high-
ways made it possible for companies around, for instance, Sao Paolo to reach distant
markets.43 However, despite these possible negative short-term effects, investments in
infrastructure generate regional integration and are, therefore, in the long term, an
important source of regional convergence. In addition, results of some studies have
suggested that the impact of public investment on productivity plays a more impor-
tant role in poorer regions than in richer ones.44
Another objective of a regional policy should be to encourage sectoral mobility of
workers. This is particularly the case for Colombia, which has low internal migration
rates despite significant disparities in regional welfare. Redistribution of employment
across regions has, indeed, been shown to be one of the most important sources of
convergence between regions.45
A regional policy instrument that has been widely used is business location incen-
tives, either in the form of business location grants or in the form of regional tax
breaks. Such initiatives have in many cases been shown to reduce regional disparities,
but this has been at a cost to national growth, since it leads firms to make investments
where they would not otherwise have made them. There is also a significant risk that
this might lead regions, departments or states to compete for industry investments
through tax breaks, which might  lead the wealthiest regions to attract business invest-
ments that would otherwise have been located elsewhere. We would, therefore, argue
that these types of regional policy instruments should be avoided.
2. A Framework for a Regional Policy in Colombia
We believe that a Colombian regional policy framework could be based on the initia-
tive that is currently being implemented in Brazil.46 This, which is referred to as Programa
dos Eixos Nacionais de Desenvolvimento, is a long-term regional development programme
covering the period 2003 to 2018 and with a budget of some USD 77 billion.
43 Diniz and Razavi (1993) show some evidence of isolated factories in regional markets
closing because they were not able to compete with national firms operating from Sao
Paolo.
44 See, for example, Acconcia and del Monte (1999).
45 See, for example, de la Fuente (2001), and Paci and Saba (1997).
46 See Pérez and Rowland (2004) for a discussion.
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It should, nevertheless, be emphasised that the scale of the Colombian programme,
certainly in absolute but also in real terms, is likely to be significantly smaller than its
Brazilian counterpart. This would be the first such initiative developed in Colombia,
while Brazil has a long history of regional policy. Regional disparities in Brazil are,
furthermore, much larger than in Colombia. Moreover, we are not making any attempt
here to argue for a certain size of a Colombian programme. This is a subject that needs
additional research. What we argue is that a regional policy is important, even if such
a policy could be relatively modest in its ambitions, since it would put the regional
problems and disparities on the political agenda.
The objectives of a Colombian regional policy could be:47
• Promote systemic competition,
• Mobilize the endogenous development potential of the regions,
• Encourage economic and social cohesion,
• Promote sustainable development,
• Encourage continental integration,
• Promote education in poorer regions
Such a programme would divide the country into a number of development areas
with similar geographical and socio-economic conditions.48 The Brazilian programme
divides the country into nine such development areas. In the case of Colombia, further
research is needed to decide the optimal number of areas, but we would at this early
stage estimate these to number somewhere between four and six. In Brazil, the areas
are, furthermore, very different in size, which would most likely be the case in Colom-
bia as well. The smallest such development area in Brazil has only 0.5 million inhab-
itants, while the largest has some 60 million inhabitants.
A great advantage of this division of the country is that it is directly focused on the
regional differences, Safford and Palacios (2002). This division also makes the programme
much easier to follow up and to evaluate then, let us say, a division of the country into
the current 32 departments. It also makes it easier to compare the achievements of
different departments within the same development area. It should, nevertheless, be
emphasised that a division like this, even if very efficient in focusing the minds of the
policy makers on the regional issue, is also relatively crude. It suits Colombia and
Brazil, which are developing countries with a significant part of the population suffer-
ing from poverty. It would, however, not be suitable for a developed country with a
sophisticated and ambitious regional policy, like many of the European countries.
The main objective of the programme is to promote the growth of the individual
development areas by exploiting their current comparative and competitive advan-
tages. This is done through developing the present strengths and advantages of each
individual area.
47 The first five points are the same as for the Brazilian programme.
48 In Brazil, these development areas have formally been defined as territorial spaces
delimited to planning targets according to socio-economic and environmental dynamics.
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The first two objectives described above are not only about taking advantage of
current comparative and competitive advantages, but also generating new potentiali-
ties. Competition has to be focused on those goods and services in which each geo-
graphic area is specialized. For example, the Caribbean Coast has a huge potential in
some specific areas: tourism, mining, industry, and cattle activities. In the case of
central region there is a highly educated population  whose potential should be used
to strengthen research and development capabilities. This kind of promotion would
take regions to mobilize their own potential development.
Economic and social cohesion refer to the principle of participation. Social par-
ticipation should be promoted, for example through voting systems as the most im-
portant democratic expression. This objective can be carried out through many ways;
nevertheless, the most important must be confidence in public and private institu-
tions, which can be obtained  by having honest politicians and enterprise managers.
Of course it is a very difficult objective to carry out, but creation of public perfor-
mance viewers Indicators would guarantee the success of regional policies. From the
economic point of view, non-regressive taxation systems, and an adequate and well-
developed decentralization system, are needed. In an international context, there is
proof of the need to be linked to an international trade system in order to improve
competitive and comparative advantages. This fact will, of course, raise economic
efficiency in the production processes.
The programme should also have as a major objective to promote education in the
poorer regions. As discussed earlier, these are in many cases lagging behind in educa-
tional achievement. This is particularly important in the case of primary and second-
ary education, since children in those ages are in most cases tied to their family. When
it comes to university education, the mobility of students should instead be promoted.
Educational achievements and goals should, moreover, be unified and standardised
across the country, aiming at increasing the quality of schools and education in poor
areas to the same level as that of the wealthier areas. This might, in fact, be the most
important objective of a regional policy, since an area with poor educational achieve-
ments will suffer from lacking human capital for many years to come.
Once all of these objectives can be carried out, sustainable development will
begin to be guaranteed. The main tool to do this is to maintain these achievements
once they have been attained.
3. Regional Impact of Current Policies
for Distribution of Wealth
Colombia currently has a number of policy initiatives in place for redistribution of
wealth. Such initiatives include a redistributive tax system, and a division of the
urban population into socio-economic strata, where the lower strata receive subsidised
utilities and healthcare. This distribution policy does, however, work better in some
regions than in others. Some of the objectives of a regional policy might, in fact, be
achieved simply by making these distributional policy initiatives work in all the
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regions of the country. However, distributional and regional policies are clearly differ-
ent, and should be kept separated. Since distributional policy initiatives might have a
large regional impact, we will, nevertheless,  briefly present the main features of the
Colombian distributional policy and discuss its regional impact.
The system of stratification divides the population in the urban areas of the coun-







The division into strata is based on the standard of the residence of an inhabitant.
In particular, the size, the construction materials and finish, as well as the geo-eco-
nomic level of the neighbourhood are taken into consideration when determining the
stratum. The objective of the system is to mirror the wealth of the inhabitants and,
therefore, their ability to pay.
Public services, such as gas, electricity, water and telephone are subisidised for the
lower strata by the upper strata. Stratum 1, 2 and 3 receive a discount of 50 percent, 40
percent and 15 percent respectively on their bills, which is financed by charging the
higher strata more for the services they consume.
Through the SISBEN49 programme, the lower strata also receive discounts on
healthcare. Stratum 1 does not pay for healthcare, while stratum 2 and 3 pay 10 percent
and 20 percent of the cost respectively. People of the higher strata, who should have
insurance cover, pay the full cost. The objective of this system is to provide basic
healthcare to the poorest and most vulnerable part of the population.
Many other costs, such as, for example, tuition fees in public schools and univer-
sities, are also subsidised through the strata system, where the lower strata pay consid-
erably less than the higher strata.
The design of the system of stratification is, indeed, both sophisticated and clever.
One problem is, nevertheless, that the system is under-funded, particularly in the
poorer parts of the country. The system has also in many cases been abused, where, for
example, it might be possible to receive a SISBEN identity card of a lower stratum
through bribes. In many towns and cities, the local government has stopped issuing
lower-strata SISBEN identity cards, because the system is stretched to its financial
49 SISBEN stands for Sistema de Selección de Beneficiarios, the Selection System of Benefi-
ciaries.
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limits or simply because these cards are instead given to corrupt politicians and their
accomplices. This effectively leaves a significant part of the poor population without
access to healthcare.
If this programme was properly funded and worked as intended, it would most
certainly have a significant regional impact, where, for example, social services and
healthcare on an aggregate level would be subsidised in poor areas by the inhabitants
of the richer areas. Research is needed to determine the exact regional impact of this
programme as well as what actions are needed to get it to work as initially intended.
There is in general a need for research into the net redistribution of wealth between
different socio-economic groups, as well as the regional impact of this re-distribution.
Cardoso (2000), for example, presents such a study on Brazil. Table 3 illustrates some
perverse realities in Brazil, where, for example, 65.1 percent of Government pension
expenditure goes to the wealthiest 20 percent of the population. The results of this
study, in fact, suggest that there is a net re-distribution of wealth within Brazil to the
wealthiest 20 percent from the rest of the population.
Table 3
Distribution of the Brazilian Government’s social expenditure, 1999
Source: Cardoso (2000).
particularly since many of the rich do not pay the taxes they are supposed to pay,
either because of evasion or because of exemption. The situation might very well be
the same in Colombia, and this might have a significant regional impact.
Even if the distributional policies have a considerable regional impact, they are
not regional policies per se. The objective of a distributional policy is to redistribute

















Scholarships Pension expenditure Unemployment benefits
Poorest 20% Middle Class Richest 20%
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is not the objective of such a policy. The main objective of a regional policy is, as
discussed earlier, to promote the growth of lagging regions. Even if regional and
distributional policies should be aligned in the sense that the effects of one on the
other have to be identified and analysed, they are distinctly different, and should be
kept separate.
4. The Issue of Corruption
As for most types of economic policies, corruption might seriously impede the
effectiveness of a regional policy initiative, even if this is brilliantly designed.50
The largest cost of corruption is not the direct theft of public funds by corrupt policy
makers, but the so called directly unproductive profit-seeking activities such poli-
ticians tend to indulge in.51 These are projects that have little usefulness for the
society, but are implemented anyway, simply because they offer an excellent oppor-
tunity to steal large sums of public funds. Such activities might, for example, in-
clude unnecessary construction projects or unnecessary procurements. This implies
that the cost of corruption to society is of a much higher magnitude than the funds
stolen by corrupt officials.
Corruption levels, furthermore, have a regional distribution, where some regional
(departmental as well as municipal) governments are more corrupt than others. In
general, poor regions tend to be worse governed than rich regions. Corruption might
offer one explanation to this.52 However, poor regions might also lack the necessary
resources, both in financial and in human terms. This is an area that certainly needs to
be researched. There is otherwise a significant risk that regional development funds
are embezzled in the regions that most need them.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The study presented in this paper is the second part of a project to develop recom-
mendations for a framework of a regional policy for Colombia. The first part of this
project was presented in Pérez and Rowland (2004), which studied and evaluated four
cases of regional policy initiatives, the European Union, Spain, Italy and Brazil.
In this paper we have analysed regional disparities in Colombia. We have shown
that these are both significant and persistent over time. GDP per capita in Chocó, the
poorest of Colombia’s departments, is only 32.6 percent of per-capita GDP in
Cundinamarca with Bogotá included. This figure has, furthermore, not changed sig-
nificantly over the past two decades. This calls for the implementation of a regional
policy initiative to promote the development of the poorer regions of the country.
50 See Bardhan (1997) for a discussion on corruption.
51 See, for example, Bhagwati (1982).
52 The causality might as well run in the opposite direction, i.e. that high levels of corrupton
in poor regions is caused by bad governance.
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In this paper we are proposing a regional policy framework for Colombia, based on
a policy initiative that is currently being implemented in Brazil. That policy divides the
country into a number of development areas (nine in the Brazilian case) with similar
geographical and socio-economic conditions. The main objective of the programme is
to promote the growth of these individual areas by exploiting their current comparative
and competitive advantages. Another key objective of the Colombian regional policy
would be to promote education in the poorer regions, which both quantitatively and
qualitatively lag behind Colombia’s wealthier regions in this aspect.
Colombia, furthermore, has a sophisticated distributional policy initiative in place.
However, the regional impacts of this policy are not known, and further research is
needed in this area. On an aggregate level this programme should induce a net transfer
of funds from the wealthier regions to the poorer ones. The objective of a regional
policy is, nevertheless, clearly different from that of a distributional policy, and the
two should, therefore, be kept separate.
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